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ABSTRACT
DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT
ON THE VALUE OF THE FIRM
BY
BÜLENT KARAAĞAÇ
M. B. A.
SUPERVISOR : AYŞE YÜCE 
DECEMBER, 1997
The dividend policy o f the firms is very important for the investors. Because 
dividends contain management’s superior information o f the firm’s recent 
performance and their assessment o f future performance. Therefore, it’s expected to 
observe an increase in share prices associated with public announcement o f a 
dividend increase. Throughout the thesis; I tried to find whether dividend 
announcements have an effect on stock prices in Istanbul Stock Exchange or not. The 
results I found are not consistent with the view that dividends have valuable 
information for the investors. Finally the reasons for these results are presented.
Keywords : Dividend anno.uncement, Signaling Hypothesis, Free cashflow 
Hypothesis, Capital gain yield. Dividend yield
ÖZET
TEMETTÜ DUYURULARININ 
ŞİRKETİN DEĞERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ
BÜLENT KARAAĞAÇ
YÜKSEK LİSANS TEZİ,İŞLETME FAKÜLTESİ 
TEZ DANIŞMANI: DR. AYŞE YÜCE 
ARALIK, 1997
Firmaların temettü politikaları yatırımcılar için çok önemlidir. Çünkü temettüler, 
yönetimin şirketin şu andaki ve gelecekteki performansı ile ilgili bilgiler 
içermektedir. Bu nedenle temettü artışları duyuruları ile birlikte hisse senetleri 
fiyatlarında da artış beklenmektedir. Tez boyunca İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler 
Borsasında temettü duyurularının hisse senedi fiyatları üstünde etkisi olup olmadığını 
bulmaya çalıştım. Sonuçlar temettülerin yatırımcılar için değerli bilgiler taşıdğma 
dair görüşlerle uyumlu değildir. Son olarak çıkan sonuçlarla ilgili sebepler 
sunulmuştur.
Anahtar Kelimeler : Temettü duyuruları. Sinyal hipotezi. Serbest nakit akış hipotezi, 
sermaye kazancı, temettü kazancı
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I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to have an understanding of the dividend 
announcement effect on the value of the firm. The impact of a firm's dividend 
policy is an unresolved issue. There are many studies and theories about the 
dividend policy of the firms.
While determining the dividend amounts, firstly it’s thought that firms 
consider only the last year’s dividend and this year’s earnings. This model 
seems to provide a fairly good explanation of how companies decide on the 
dividend rate, but it’s unlikely to be the whole story.
A positive wealth impact results from a dividend policy that communicates 
valuable information to investors. Dividends generally provide a vehicle for 
communicating management's superior information concerning their 
interpretation of the firm's recent performance and their assessment of future 
performance.
By this valuable information investors try to gain some excess return. 
Most firms ,that pay dividends exhibit behavior which results in constant dividend 
payouts, increased their dividend payment amounts only when management is 
relatively certain that higher dividend payout can be maintained indefinitely. 
Given this type of management behavior, it is likely that investors will interpret 
an increase in current dividend payout as a message that management 
anticipates permanently higher cash flows from investment. We may , therefore.
expect to observe an increase in share prices associated with public 
announcement of a dividend increase.
If dividend changes are to have an impact on share values, it is necessary 
that they convey information about future cash flows, but it is not sufficient. 
Therefore it becomes an empirical question whether or not announcements of 
dividend changes actually affect the share value.
In the literature survey, I will firstly explain Lintner model that simply 
explains the behavior of corporate dividend policy over time. Secondly, I am 
going to look at the possibility of clientele and ex-date effects that mainly 
concerns about a question " Do people in high tax brackets avoid investing in 
high-dividend companies in order to escape higher income taxes on dividend 
income? "
Third, I will investigate about the signaling hypothesis that tests whether 
the information content of dividend increases affects the value of the firm or not.
Finally, I will briefly give the results of the studies that are done about the 
dividend announcement effect.
II. LITERATURE SURVEY
A. A DIVIDEND POLICY MODEL
Lintner [1956] conducted interviews with 28 carefully selected companies 
to investigate their thinking on the determination of dividend policy. He 
suggested that (1) managers focused on the change in the existing rate of 
dividend payout, not on the amount of the newly established payout as such; (2) 
most managements tried to avoid making changes in their dividend rates that 
might have to be reversed within a year or so; (3) major changes in earnings "out 
of line" with existing dividend rates were the most important determinants of a 
company's dividend decisions ; and (4) investment requirements generally had
little effect on modifying the pattern of dividend behavior. So according to these 
observations most companies had somewhat flexible but nevertheless 
reasonably well-defined standards. They try to move toward a full adjustment of 
dividend payout to earnings. Lintner suggests that corporate dividend behavior 
can be described on the basis of the following equation :
Change in dividends = aj + Cj (D*jt - Dj t.-|) + ejt 
where
Cj = the speed of adjustment to the difference between a target dividend 
payout and last year's payout
D*it = the target dividend payout 
Dj_t-1 = last period's dividend payout
aj, ejt =a constant and a normally distributed random error term 
respectively
B. CLIENTELE EFFECTS AND EX-DATE EFFECTS
The dividend clientele effect was originally suggested by Miller and 
Modigliani [1961]. Their argument went like this :
' A firm sets a particular dividend payout policy, which then attracts a 
"clientele" consisting of those investors who like this particular dividend policy. 
For example some stockholders, such as university endowment funds and 
retired individuals, prefer current income to future capital gains, so they want the 
firm payout a higher percentage of its earnings. Other stockholders have no
need for current investment income - they would simply reinvest any dividend 
income received, after first paying income taxes on it, so they favor a low payout 
ratio.'
The clientele effect is a possible explanation for management reluctance 
to alter established payout ratios because such changes might cause current 
shareholders to incur unwanted transaction costs.
Elton and Gruber [1970] attempted to measure the clientele effects by 
observing the average price decline when stock goes ex-dividend. They 
discovered that the average price decline as a percentage of dividend paid was 
%77.7. They continued by arguing that : " the lower a firm's dividend yield the 
smaller the percentage of his total return that a stockholder expects to receive in 
the form of dividends and the larger the percentage he expects to receive in the 
form of capital gains. Therefore, investors who held stocks which have high 
dividend yields should be in low tax brackets relative to stockholders who hold 
stocks with low dividend yield " As a result Elton and Gruber concluded that the 
evidence suggests that M&M were right in hypothesizing a clientele effect.
Pettit [1977] has tested for dividend clientele effects by examining the 
portfolio positions of approximately 914 individual accounts. He argued that 
stocks with low dividend yields will be preferred by investors with high income, 
by younger investors, by investors whose ordinary and capital gains tax rates 
differ substantially, and by investors whose portfolios have high systematic risk. 
The evidence suggested that there is a clientele effect. However, the study in
no way suggested that the market price of a security is determined by the firm’s 
dividend policy.
Another study by Lewellen, Stanley, Lease and Schlarbaum [1978] was 
drawn from the same database as the Pettit study but reached different 
conclusions. They suggested only a very weak dividend clientele effect.
Eades, Hess and Kim [1984] examined the excess rate of return for 
equally weighted ex-date portfolios in the period of 1962-1980. They found that 
abnormal returns are not uniquely associated with the ex-day. No good 
explanation for this result has yet been proposed. Also they found significant 
positive returns for stock splits and stock dividends and significant negative 
returns for nontaxable cash dividends.
C. SIGNALING HYPOTHESIS
If investors expect a company's dividend to increase by 5 percent per 
year, and if the dividend is in fact increased by 5 percent, then the stock price 
generally will not change significantly on the day the dividend increase is 
announced. In Wall Street parlance, such a dividend increase would be 
"discounted" or anticipated, by the market. However, if investors expect a 5 
percent increase, but the company actually increases the dividend by 25 
percent, this would generally be accompanied by an increase in the price of 
stock. Conversely, a less than expected dividend increase or a reduction would 
generally result in a price decline.
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961) , a larger than expected 
increase is taken by investors as a "signal" that the firm's management forecasts 
improved future earnings, whereas a dividend reduction signals a forecast of 
poor earnings. Thus, M&M claimed that investor's reactions to the change in 
dividend payments do not show that investors prefer dividends to retained 
earnings; rather, the stock price changes simply indicate that important 
information is contained in dividend announcements. This theory is referred to 
as the information content, or signaling, hypothesis.
D. DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECT
The first study to examine this issue was the stock split study of Fama, 
Fisher, Jensen and Roll [1969]. They found that when splits were accompanied 
by dividend announcements there was an increase in adjusted share prices for 
the group which announced dividend increases and a decline in share prices for 
the dividend decrease group.
Another study of the effect of unexpected dividend changes on share 
prices has been made by Pettit [1972]. Pettit used both monthly and daily data 
to investigate the abnormal performance of 135 firms. He found that most of the 
price adjustment takes place very quickly either on the dividend announcement 
date or the following day. Furthermore price changes appeared to be very 
significant. This leaded Pettit to conclude that substantial information is 
conveyed by the announcement of dividend changes. Also the results of his
investigation clearly supported the proposition that the market makes use of 
announcements of changes in dividend payments in assessing the value of a 
security. In other words, the market reacts very dramatically to these 
announcements when dividends are reduced or when a substantial increase 
takes place. The effect of a more moderate dividend increase is proportionately 
less than of substantial dividend increases. Also the results implied that a 
dividend announcement may convey significantly more information than the 
information implicit in an earnings announcement.
Most of the information implicit in the announcement was reflected in the 
securities' prices as of the end of the announcement period. This lended support 
to the proposition that the market is reasonably efficient on both monthly and 
daily basis. The rather large anticipation effect evident in the monthly data could 
be the result of either the use of insider information (an inefficient market) or the 
results of announcements related to the dividend change (an efficient market). 
The small anticipation effect in the daily data, however, implied that the use of 
insider information is not a major factor affecting short returns.
Watts [1973] found a positive dividend announcement effect but 
concluded that the information content is of no economic significance because it 
would not enable a trader with monopolistic access to the information to earn 
abnormal returns after transaction costs. Watts proceeded in two stages. First, 
he developed a model to predict dividend changes It is the same model that 
Fama and Babiak [1968] found to provide the best prediction of next period's
dividends. Then the abnormal performance index for a security is computed as 
the product of its one-month abnormal returns. He looked at the abnormal 
performance index for 24 months averaged across 310 firms. The performance 
of firms with dividend increases was better than that of firms with dividend 
decreases, but the greatest difference between the two samples in the 6 months 
around the dividend change is only %0.7 in the month of dividend. This was a 
trivial difference.
Pettit's (1972) results have been criticized because he used the observed 
dividend changes rather than the unexpected dividend changes. Kwan [1981] 
has improved on Pettit's design by forming portfolios based on unexpected 
dividend changes, and he finds statistically significant abnormal returns when 
firms announce unexpectedly large dividend changes.
A study by Aharony and Swary [1980] separated the information content 
of quarterly earnings reports from that of unexpected quarterly dividend 
changes. They examined only those quarterly dividend and earnings 
announcements made public on different dates within any given quarter. Their 
findings strongly supported the hypothesis that changes in quarterly cash 
dividends provide useful information beyond that provided by corresponding 
quarterly earnings numbers.
Woolridge [1983] studied the effect of dividend announcements on 
nonconvertible bonds and nonconvertible preferred stock in an attempt to 
separate expropriation effects from announcement effects. If dividend payouts to
shareholders were viewed as payments of collaterizable assets then debt 
holders and preferred shareholders would view dividend increases as bad news 
and the market value of their claims on the firm would fall upon the 
announcement of dividend increases. On the other hand, if dividend increases 
were signals about higher future cashflows, then bondholders and preferred 
stockholders should feel more secure and the market value of their claims 
should increase. Woolridge's empirical results supported the signaling 
hypothesis. At the announcement date abnormal returns were positive given 
unexpected dividend increases and negative given unexpected dividend 
decreases.
Asquith and Mullins [1983] studied the effect on shareholder wealth of the 
initial dividend announcement - the firm's first dividend . This study found large, 
statistically significant two-day announcement abnormal returns for initial 
dividend announcements, 3.7% to 4%. In addition, they studied trading volume 
around the announcement date, and between the announcement and ex-dates. 
Unusual trading volume may be an evidence of clientele changes induced when 
high tax bracket shareholders sell out to low tax bracket investors when the 
higher dividend payout is announced. They found statistically significant 
abnormal volume increases during the announcement week that are related to 
the information content of dividends. There was only weak evidence for higher 
volume following the announcement date and hence only weak support for 
clientele adjustments.
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Brickley [1983] studied the announcement effect of specially designated 
dividends - those labeled by management as "extra", "special" or "year-end" and 
compares them surrounding regular dividend increases. Specially designated 
dividends were interesting because they were not intended to be a part of 
continuing higher dividend payout and may therefore not be interpreted by the 
market as a signal about higher cashflows. Brickley’s results supported the 
opposite conclusion - namely that the market did react positively to the 
information content of specially designated dividends but that dollar-for-dollar 
regular dividends convey more information.
Lang and Litzenberger [1989] found some support for the free cash flow 
hypothesis, namely that " dividend changes for overinvesting firms signal 
information about investment policies". Their evidence, however, was also 
consistent to some extent with the "informational content of dividends" 
hypothesis.
Baja] and Vijh [1990] provided evidence that anticipated dividend yield 
affects the price reactions to dividend announcements in a manner consistent 
with the dividend-clientele hypothesis. Again their evidence did not exclude the 
dividend informational content hypothesis.
Aharony and Dotan [1994] provided additional empirical evidence 
pertaining to the issue of whether quarterly cash dividend announcements 
convey useful information about a firm's future profitability. Their results, based 
on a large sample of regular quarterly cash dividend changes, indicated that
11
firms that increased (decreased) their dividends realized, on average, greater 
(smaller) unexpected accounting earnings in subsequent periods than firms that 
did not change their dividends.
In sum the evidence in support of the informational content of dividends is 
overwhelming. Unexpected dividend changes did convey information to the 
market about expected future cashflows.
E. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIVIDENDS AND VALUE
Friend and Puckett [1964] used cross-section data to test the effect of 
dividend payout on share value. Prior to their work, most studies had related 
stock prices to current dividends and retained earnings, and reported that higher 
dividend payout was associated with higher price-earnings ratios. Friend and 
Puckett argued that in equilibrium, firms would change their dividend payout until 
the marginal effect of dividends is equal to the marginal effect of retained 
earnings. This would provide the optimum effect on their price per share.
Another study done by Black and Scholes [1974] used capital asset 
pricing theory to control for risk. Their conclusion was quite strong. " It's not 
possible to demonstrate, using the best empirical methods, that the expected 
returns on high yield common stock differ from the expected returns on low yield 
common stocks either before or after taxes.". Their study presented an empirical 
evidence that the before-tax returns on common stock are unrelated to corporate 
dividend payout policy. They adjusted for risk by using the CAPM.
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Brennan [1970] has shown that if effective capital gains tax rates are 
lower than effective rates on dividend income, then investors will demand a 
higher rate of return on securities with higher dividend payout.
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy [1979] also tested the relationship 
between dividend and security returns. They used the Brennan [1970] model 
with monthly data for individual securities. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy 
concluded that risk-adjusted returns are higher for securities with higher 
dividend yields. The implication was that dividends were undesirable; hence 
higher returns were necessary to compensate investors in order to induce them 
to hold high dividend yield stocks.
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy have been criticized by Miller and Scholes 
[1982] for their handling the information effect of dividend announcements. Of 
the firms which pay their dividend (i.e., go ex-dividend) in month t, about %30 to 
%40 also announced the dividend in the same month. When the announcement 
date and the ex-dividend date occured in the same month, the monthly return 
would contain both the information effect and the tax effect (if any).
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III. METHODOLOGY
In the study, I chose 124 firms that are listed in ISE. These firms met the 
following criteria ;
1. They are listed in ISE as of the beginning of 1995
2. There are sufficient avaiiable data for that year
3. There are no other valuable announcements made by the firm that 
will affect the value of the stock except dividend announcement.
The dividend announcement dates and the amount of dividends paid by 
these companies were then collected for years 1990 -1994 (Table 1 and 
Table2). So the study period is 5 years. I chose 1990 as the beginning year of 
my study because before this year, our stock market was very small.
I put all the firms into 3 different categories according to the dividend 
changes for each year. These categories are :
1. Firms with dividend decreases
2. Firms with dividend increases
3. Firms with constant dividend
For the first two categories the firms are grouped according to the 
dividend change amount and the percentages are given in Table 4A and 4B.
The study uses daily stock return data to compute excess stockholder
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returns and to examine dividend announcements for each firm. To find the return 
of^ach stock each day we used the equation :
Rjt = Ln (Pit/Pit-1)
where Ri^: the return on security i during day t
P it : the adjusted closing price of security i on day t 
Pit-1 : the adjusted closing price of security i on day t-1
The daily excess return for a security is estimated by :
®it “  ^it ■ ^(^it)
where eit : the excess return to security i for day t 
Rj^: the return on security i on day t 
E(Rj|) : the expected rate of return on security i on day t
E(Rjt) is found by using the equation of = a + bR^^t where 
R ^^ : the market return during day t
Firstly, I tried to find a and b values by using [ -200 days, - 50 days ] data 
of return on each stock and return on ISE index. I used simple regression to find 
the best estimates of a and b.
The average excess returns on a portfolio of N securities for day t is the
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equally-weighted arithmetic average of excess returns :
ARt= 1/N *Zejt
Daily average cumulative excess returns, CAR, are formed by summing 
the average excess returns over event time where the CAR period is for the 
period t = -10 days until t = -i-IO days.
Hypothesis Testing
For each dividend change category, different hypothesis are tested by the 
examination of price changes with respect to the return of ISE.
1. Ho : Firms with dividend increases will not experience significant price 
increases relative to the market on the announcement date
Ha : Firms with dividend increases will experience significant price 
increases relative to the market on the announcement date
2. Ho: Firms with dividend decreases will not experience significant price 
decreases relative to the market on the announcement date
Ha : Firms with dividend decreases will experience significant price 
decreases relative to the market on the announcement date
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3. Ho : Firms with constant dividend will experience significant price 
changes relative to the market on the announcement date
Ha : Firms with constant dividend will experience insignificant price 
changes relative to the market on the announcement date
Then the significance of the returns is tested by using t-test. For the null 
hypothesis to be tested that the mean day t abnormal return is equal to zero, I 
computed t-statistic a s :
t = ARt/(S(ARt)/VN)
where S(ARt) is the standard deviation of the average excess return of 
the sample on day t
To test whether the average cumulative excess return from day t1 until 
day t2 is significantly positive, I computed the statistical significance of CAR by t- 
test a s :
t = CAR/(S(CAR)/VN)
where S(CAR): the standard deviation of CAR
N : Number of firms in the sample
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A dividend announcement date is the date when news of the dividend 
appears in the ISE daily journal. Neither the ex-dividend day nor the day the 
dividend paid is considered to be an announcement date. So in this study 2-day 
excess return is necessary to capture the entire impact of a dividend 
announcement. Day t=0 is the day the news of the dividend is published in the 
ISE journal. In many cases, however, the news is announced on the previous 
day, t= -1, and reported the next day. If a dividend is announced before the 
market closes, the market will respond the next day and the announcement day 
is indeed zero. Thus in reality there is a 2-day announcement" day ", t = -1 and t 
= 0. So as a result, 2-day average excess return is generated for each dividend 
announcement examined.This 2-day return is calculated as ;
Average of e^ .-| q) = 1/N * E ej(.-| q) for each security 
where ej(.-| q) = ej.-| + ejQ
ej.-i : the excess return to security i on the day prior to the published 
dividend announcement in the ISE journal
ejo : the excess return to security i on the day the dividend announcement 
is published in ISE journal.
Finally a t-statistic is calculated for average of e^.i qj by ;
Average of e^.i q) / (Se(-1,0) > ©) - 
where Se(-1 ,o) ■ standard deviation of the 2-day excess returns
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0  : square root of N
N : the number of firms in the sample
1 examine these results of each category year by year.Then I also 
investigate 1990-1993 period wholly to learn the long term trend of dividend 
announcement effect for each firm. I separated year 1994 from this period and 
compared this year result with the 1990-1993 period.
In order to understand whether these excess returns exist only for the 
dividend announcement date or not, I also study the average returns of [-10,0], 
[-4,0], [-2,0], [0,2], [0,4] and [0,10] around the announcement date for each year.
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This section examines how stock prices change with the announcement of 
dividend payments. In the Appendix part, the average daily excess returns 
(Table 5A,5B,5C) for the 20-day period surrounding the dividend announcement 
for the sample I used in each category and the associated t-ratios (Table 
6A,6B,6C), are presented for each day. I found that the results don’t seem to 
show any significance at 0.05 significance level.
The 2-day excess return and the associated statistics for each category 
are given in the appendix part (Table 7A,7B,7C). T-critical for alpha = 0.05 is 
1.643 for dividend decrease and increase category and 1.96 for constant 
dividend category. I check whether t-calculated is greater than t-critical for 
dividend increase category, t-calculated is less than t-critical for dividend 
decrease and -t-critical < t-calculated < t-critical for constant dividend category 
to reject the hypothesis of Ho .
The statistics for dividend increase category shows that there is an 
evidence that investors may gain an abnormal return at the announcement 
date. The opposite is true for dividend decrease. For constant dividend category, 
it means that the investor will not lose and gain anything at that date.
For dividend decrease category (Table 7A) ; negative returns are 
obtained in years 1990,1993 and 1994, but only year 1993 result is significant 
at 0.05 significance level.
IV. RESULTS
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For dividend increase category (Table 7B) ; positive returns are obtained 
in years 1990, 1992 and 1993, but none of the results is significant at 0.05 
significance level.
For constant dividend category (Table 7C) , in all years,except 1991, 
investors obtain positive return.
When we investigate the whole 1990-1993 period; only the result of 
constant dividend category show significance at 0.05 significance level (Table 
8A,8B,8C). For dividend decrease category, a positive average return is found 
at the dividend announcement date like dividend increase category. But these 
results are not significant. When I compare them with year 1994, we observe a 
negative return for both dividend increase and decrease categories although we 
got positive return for 1990-1993 period . But both of these results are not 
significant. Also constant dividend category’s result is not significant for 1994.
When we examine the firms’ behavior for the change in dividends( Table 
3), the percentage of the firms that preferred to decrease their dividends is 
higher than others for year 1990, 1991 and 1992. But for year 1993 and 1994 a 
higher percentage of the firms preferred to increase their dividends.
For dividend decrease category: as expected,all years except 1991, the 
percentage of the firms examined that showed a negative market reaction to the 
announcement of low dividends is higher than the percentage of the firms that 
are affected positively by the low dividend announcement (Table 3A).
For dividend increase category; only in year 1990 , the percentage of the
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firms examined that showed a positive market reaction to the announcement of 
high dividends is higher than the percentage of the firms that are affected 
negatively by the high dividend announcement (Table 3B).This was not an 
expected result.
For constant dividend category; only in 1991, the percentage of the firms 
examined that showed a negative market reaction to the announcement of 
constant dividend is higher than the percentage of the firms that are affected 
positively by the dividend announcement (Table 3C).
As easily seen in these tables, the percentage of the firms that showed a 
negative reaction to the announcement of dividend change ( increase or 
decrease) is high . This is an interesting result.
When we examine the results in Table 9A,9B and 9C of Appendix part 
that shows the CAR for [-10,0], [-4,0], [-2,0], [0,2], [0,4] and [0,10] around the 
announcement date for each year, we couldn’t make a prediction about the 
general trend of returns. In 1994 all CARs are negative for each range because 
of the 1994 economic crisis except the constant dividend category. In this 
category (-2,2) range shows a positive return. In 1993, all CARs are positive 
after dividend announcement date and negative before that date except again 
the constant dividend category. In this category all CARs are positive. The 
opposite is true for 1991 and 1992. Most of the CARs are positive before 
dividend announcement and negative after the announcement. 1990 results do 
not give a clue about a trend.
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Results demonstrate that, for the sample I used in my thesis, dividend 
announcements do not affect the stock prices significantly. The associated t- 
statistics (Table 7A, 7B, 7C) are not consistent with the view that dividends have 
unique and valuable information to investors.
Unlike the detailed focus of other announcements, dividends can be used 
as a simple, comprehensive signal of management's interpretation of the firm's 
recent performance and its future prospects. So this announcement should be 
very important for the investor. But in Turkey, the situation is something 
different. People in Turkey usually consider the capital gain yield when they are 
choosing the stock they invest. They generally ignore the dividend yield while 
considering the expected returns of stocks.
Investors in Turkey also are not long term investors. When they gain a 
significant return, they sell this stock and buy another stock. They usually ignore 
the possible good future performance of that stock. For this reason the valuable 
information in the dividend announcement is not used effectively by this type of 
investors.
The dividend amount of the stocks are insignificant that some investors 
do not consider getting this money from their investment agencies. For example, 
the market price of the stock is 20000 TL and the firm announced its dividend as 
30% of nominal value which is 1000 TL. This means for an investment of
V. CONCLUSION
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20.000.000 TL, the investor will get only 300.000 TL. This amount is only 1.5% 
of the investment. If the dividend percentage increases to 60%, (a 100% 
increase according to the previous year), this amount is still not significant. 
When we look at the average 5 year inflation rate (80%), the dividend amounts 
are not enough to compensate this inflation rate. In this case, although the 
dividend increase seems to be significant, the investors may not value this 
dividend.
Because of the low volume in ISE according to world standards, you can 
easily speculate with one stock by saying something bad or good about that firm. 
This may increase the price volatility. This situation is seen in our results that 
there are significant positive and negative returns for other days (Table 6A,6B 
and 6C) .
Also in Turkey conditions change very fast. And these changing 
conditions (political and economical) shows its impact on ISE immediately. We 
saw this huge impact in 1994 crisis very well. Because of this bad effect, firms 
may increase their dividends in that year but this may not be seen as an 
increase in stock price. This also may be another explanation for not observing 
the dividend announcement effect.
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TABLE 1
DIVIDEND ANNOUNCEMENT DATES
ADANA А 
ADANA С 
AFYON CIMENTO 
AKAL TEKSTİL 
AKBANK 
AKCIMENTO 
AKSA
ALARKO HOL.
ALARKO SAN.
ALTINYILDIZ
ANADOLU CAM
ARCELIK
ASELSAN
ASLAN CIMENTO
AYGAZ
BANVIT
BAGFAS
ВЕКО
BİRLİK TUTUN
BOLU CIMENTO
BRISA
BURCELIK
ÇELİK HALAT
CESME ALTINYUNUS
CIMSA
CIMENTAS
ÇANAKKALE CİM.
ÇUKUROVA ELEKTRİK
DEMIRBANK
DENİZLİ CAM
DERIMOD
DEVA HOL.
DISBANK
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
15/2/91 23/3/92 30/3/93 10/3/94
15/2/91 23/3/92 30/3/93 10/3/94
20/3/91 28/5/92 20/4/93
5/4/90 11/3/91 31/3/92 19/3/93 16/3/94
19/2/91 18/3/92 17/3/93 4/3/94
23/3/90 1/3/91 20/3/92 16/3/93 16/3/94
4/4/90 26/3/91 31/3/92 19/3/93 16/3/94
29/3/90 22/3/91 24/3/92 31/3/93 16/3/94
30/3/92 30/3/93 16/3/94
27/3/92 31/3/93 29/3/94
13/3/90 6/3/91 15/3/93 4/3/94
6/4/90 12/4/91 2/4/92 16/3/93 21/1/94
22/3/90
30/3/90
3/4/90
2/4/90
9/4/90
1/4/91 30/3/92 25/2/93 8/3/94
28/3/91 26/3/92 30/3/93 31/3/94
28/3/91 14/4/92 2/4/93 21/1/94
31/3/93 31/3/94
4/4/91 26/3/92 1/4/93 24/3/94
16/3/93 21/1/94
25/3/92 29/3/93 29/3/94
25/3/92 19/3/93 11/3/94
19/2/91 12/3/92 12/3/93 22/3/94
26/2/93 11/3/94
11/3/91 5/3/92 29/3/93 30/3/94
22/3/91 7/4/92 5/4/93 30/3/94
12/3/91 26/3/92 17/3/93 28/3/94
5/3/93 11/2/94
9/4/92 5/4/93 18/3/94
20/4/92
14/2/92
1/4/91 
19/2/91 
1/4/91
28/5/91 20/4/92
20/3/90 21/3/91
4/3/91
13/3/92
10/2/92
18/5/93
26/2/93
21/4/93
20/4/93
31/3/93
19/2/93
4/5/94
28/2/94
8/4/94
11/3/94
21/1/94
7/2/94
DITAS DOĞAN 1/5/91 1/5/92 22/4/93 21/4/94
DOGUSAN 11/4/91 18/6/92 24/5/93 25/4/94
DOKTAS 16/3/90 27/3/91 25/2/92 16/3/93 21/1/94
DURAN OFSET 20/4/92 21/4/93 21/4/94
ECZACI İLAÇ 10/4/91 25/3/92 19/3/93 31/3/94
ECZACI YAT. 16/4/90 13/3/91 12/3/92 5/3/93 8/3/94
EDİP İPLİK 27/4/93 12/4/94
EGE BİRA 10/4/90 24/4/91 15/4/92 14/4/93 7/4/94
EGE ENDÜSTRİ 2/4/90 27/3/91 27/3/92 19/3/93 21/3/94
EGE GÜBRE 24/4/91 17/4/92 5/4/93 10/3/94
EGE SERAMİK 25/2/93 7/3/94
EMEK SİGORTA 31/3/92 31/3/93 24/3/94
ENKA 26/3/90 31/3/92 29/3/93 30/3/94
ERCIYAS BİRA 9/4/90 12/4/91 17/4/92 15/4/93 8/4/94
ERDEMIR 29/3/90 4/3/91 26/3/92 30/3/93 28/4/94
ESBANK 27/5/91 31/1/92 25/1/93 25/1/94
FENIS 27/3/91 27/3/92 5/4/93 27/4/94
FINANSBANK 26/2/90 30/1/91 21/2/92 23/2/93 2/3/94
GARANTİ BANKASI 13/2/91 6/2/92 3/3/93 11/3/94
GENTAS 13/3/90 29/4/91 20/4/92 6/2/93 16/4/94
GIMA 27/4/92 30/3/93 1/4/94
GLOBAL YAT. 26/1/93 27/1/94
GORBON ISIL 24/1/90 29/4/91 17/4/92 20/4/93 31/5/94
GOOD YEAR 29/3/90 27/3/91 24/3/92 30/3/93 25/2/94
GÜBRE FAB. 30/3/90 1/3/91 31/3/92 19/3/93 17/3/94
GÜNEY BİRA 6/4/90 29/4/91 20/4/92 16/4/93 14/4/94
HEKTAS 30/3/90 7/3/91 27/2/92 22/2/93 25/2/94
HÜRRİYET 27/3/92 15/3/93 17/3/94
İKTİSAT FINANS 6/3/90 21/1/91 17/4/92 15/3/93 23/3/94
INTEMA 9/3/90 18/3/91 12/3/92 3/2/93 4/3/94
IMP 6/3/92 17/3/93 10/2/94
IZDEMIR 7/5/90 20/4/92 3/5/93 20/3/94
IZOCAM 28/3/90 11/3/91 2/3/92 10/3/93 21/1/94
KARTONSAN 12/2/90 22/2/91 25/3/92 19/3/93 11/2/94
KAV
КОС HOL.
КОС YAT.
KEPEZ ELEKTRİK 
KELEBEK MOBİLYA 
KENT GIDA 
KONYA CIMENTO 
KORDSA 
KOYTAS
KÜTAHYA PORSELEN 
LÜKS KADİFE 
MARMARİS ALTINYUNI 
MAKINA TAKIM 
MARET 
MEDYA HOL.
METAS
MIGROS
MARMARİS MARTI 
MARDİN CIMENTO 
MARSHALL 
NETAS
NİĞDE CIMENTO 
NET HOL.
NET TURİZM
OKAN TEKSTİL
OLMUKSA
OTOSAN
PARSAN
PEG PROFILO
PETKIM
PIMAS
PINAR SU
PETROKENT
PINAR ET
PINAR UN
PINAR SUT
POLYLEN
PETROL OFİSİ
SABAH YAYINCILIK
SARKUYSAN
SIFAS
SİSE CAM
SOKSA
SIEMENS
SÖNMEZ FILAMENT 
SUN ELEKTRONİK 
TUBORG 
TEKSTILBANK 
TELETAS 
TRANSTURK HOL.
THY
TIRE KUTSAN 
T. KALKINMA BANKASI 
TOFAS FAB.
TOFAS OTO TİCARET 
TRAKYA CAM 
TSKB
T. DEMIRDOKUM 
TUPRAS 
TURCAS 
TUTUNBANK 
ÜNYE CIMENTO 
UŞAK SERAMİK 
VAKIF YAT.
VAKIF LEASING
VESTEL
YASAS
YKB
YUNSA
28/2/90 6/3/91 16/3/92 16/2/93 21/1/94
20/3/90 22/2/91 21/2/92 18/2/93 17/2/94
22/2/90 18/2/91 24/1/92 26/1/93 21/1/94
27/3/91 10/2/92 3/5/93 28/4/94
18/2/91 28/2/92 31/3/93 30/3/94
14/3/91 31/3/92 15/3/93 11/3/94
12/3/91 19/3/92 18/3/93 17/3/94
19/3/90 19/2/91 19/3/92 16/3/93 14/2/94
7/5/90 8/3/91 20/2/92 16/3/93 17/4/94
15/3/91 30/3/92 3/3/93 21/3/94
12/4/91 23/3/92 15/3/93 25/2/94
S 7/4/92 21/1/94
17/4/90 22/5/91 2/6/92 26/4/93 2/5/94
3/4/90 11/4/91 8/4/92 2/4/93 21/1/94
11/6/93 12/5/94
26/3/90 21/4/92 19/3/93 22/4/94
12/4/91 15/4/92 5/4/93 21/1/94
6/4/90 5/4/91 9/4/92 28/4/93 13/4/94
30/3/90 27/3/92 16/3/93 22/3/94
25/2/91 20/3/92 1/4/93 31/3/94
16/3/93 9/3/94
27/3/92 16/3/93 30/3/94
11/4/90 28/3/91 23/4/92 1/4/93 12/4/94
27/3/90 8/3/91 9/4/92 5/4/93 26/4/94
6/2/90 1/4/91 29/4/92 19/3/93 7/4/94
29/3/90 22/3/91 26/3/92 8/3/93 31/3/94
27/3/90 9/4/91 8/4/92 31/3/93 14/4/94
26/3/92 30/3/93 15/4/94
28/3/90 21/3/91 27/3/92 15/3/93 16/3/94
21/3/91 1/4/92 18/3/93 11/4/94
27/3/90 31/3/92 31/3/93 1/3/94
26/3/90 2/4/91 27/3/92 17/3/93 23/3/94
27/3/92 12/3/93 18/2/94
7/4/92 15/4/93 23/3/94
12/3/90 20/3/91 19/3/92 17/3/93 23/3/94
6/4/90 10/4/91 8/4/92 15/4/93 23/3/94
27/3/90 7/3/91 18/5/92 8/4/93 28/4/94
31/3/92 16/3/93 19/4/94
16/3/92 23/2/93 10/3/94
20/3/90 5/3/91 9/3/92 3/3/93 18/2/94
27/3/90 7/3/91 18/5/92 8/4/93 28/4/94
26/3/90 18/3/91 24/3/92 19/3/93 25/3/94
30/4/90 5/4/93 2/5/94
21/2/90 2/2/93 3/1/94
30/3/92 30/3/93 29/3/94
25/2/91 20/2/92 15/2/93 3/5/94
4/4/90 8/4/91 25/3/92 29/3/93 23/3/94
1/3/91 24/3/92 15/2/93 26/1/94
4/4/90 11/4/91 17/4/92 16/3/93 21/4/94
31/3/93 11/3/94
28/3/91 27/4/92 28/4/93 11/4/94
28/5/91 30/3/92 16/3/93 4/4/94
23/6/92 6/4/93
21/4/92 27/4/93 7/4/94
24/3/92 16/3/93 6/4/94
13/3/91 5/3/92 17/3/93 9/3/94
28/3/90 20/2/91 20/3/92 29/3/93 29/3/94
17/4/90 27/3/91 7/4/92 2/4/93 21/1/94
30/3/92 30/3/93 16/3/94
5/3/93 22/2/94
18/2/91 17/2/92 1/3/93 24/2/94
18/2/91 30/3/92 15/3/93 21/2/94
18/3/91 27/4/92 17/5/93 30/4/94
26/3/92 5/3/93 7/2/94
12/4/91 20/3/92 16/3/93 17/3/94
27/3/92 17/3/93 20/4/94
15/3/90 17/4/92 16/3/93 23/3/94
29/3/90 15/2/91 19/2/92 11/3/93 30/3/94
4/3/90 22/3/91 17/3/93 16/3/94
TABLE 2
DIVIDEND AMOUNTS (%)
ADANA А
ADANA С
AFYON
AKAL
AKBANK
AKCIMENTO
AKSA
ALARKO HOL 
ALARKO SAN 
TELETAS 
ALTINYILDIZ 
CESME
ANADOLU CAM
ARCELIK
ASELSAN
ASLAN CİM
AYGAZ
BAGFAS
ВЕКО
BİRLİK TUTUN
BOLU CİM
BRISA
BURCELIK
BURSA CİM
ÇANAKKALE
ÇELİK HALAT
CIMENTAS
CIMSA
ÇUKUROVA
DEMIRBANK
DENİZLİ CAM
DERIMOD
DEVA
DITAS
DOGUSAN
DOKTAS
DURAN OFSET
ECZ. İLAÇ
ECZ. YAT.
EDİP İPLİK 
EGE BİRA 
EGE ENDÜSTRİ 
EGE GÜBRE 
EGE SEFUVMIK 
EMEK SİGORTA 
ENKA HOL. 
ERCIYES BİRA 
ERDEMIR 
ESBANK 
FINANSBANK 
GENTAS 
GIMA
GLOBAL YAT. 
GOODYEAR 
GÜBRE FAB. 
GÜNEY BİRA 
HEKTAS 
HÜRRİYET 
İKTİSAT LEAS. 
INTEMA 
IMP
IZDEMIR
IZOCAM
KARTONSAN
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
268.9 119.4 120.4 143.4
26.54 11.76 11.8 14.16
223.7 76.67 54.38
14 23 15 51 62
72 63 26 30 50
6.6 25 30 50 75
55 61 65 115 90
25 40 60 15 30
40 70 215
55 27 75 15 0
33.9 24 18 72
30 0 0 0 0
29 26 0 15 25
100 165 143.6 77 100
1.39 11.87 25 50 60
25 58.5 21.58 33.35 26.25
26.5 62 60 63 32.5
40 50 15 30 60
125 75 75
6.1 6.4 0 0
37 56.8 41.7 28 13.25
44 12 6 32.5 62
50 40 50
150 350 150 80 150
1.5 10 21.5
70 60 20 40 30
100 123.4 180.5
44 20 32 85.5 220
250 120 80 100 120
50 40 37 84
20 5.5 0 0 100
129.7 0 0 12
60 60 40 0 50
10 5 100 150
20 4.1 10.8 0 4
27 70 56 67 90
30 3.2 0 0
100 100 75 25 20
45 50 50 30 25
6 2 23 0
80 130 500 100 100
135.7 50 24 50 100
0 0 0 5 50
81.7 69
3.77 2.83 5.08 6.58 20
50 40 50 70 50
12 35 100 60 60
50 30 40 40 9
34.5 17.6 15.4 20.05
255 100 84 80 105
52 52 23 11 192
0 4.5 0 0
0 40.4 93
15 0 25 60 120
0 0 0 1 20
35 75 240 40 55
60.8 71 19.15 20.25 16.85
24.5 15.25 22.1
1.73 21.95 25 34.5 102
45 20 40 10 18
3 40 42 7 95
0 0 0 0 6.5
85 82.5 87.5 75 75
30 35 20 30 62.5
KAV
KELEBEK 
KENT GIDA 
KEPEZ
КОС HOLDİNG 
КОС YAT.
KONYA CİM 
KORDSA 
KOYTAS 
KÜTAHYA 
LÜKS KADİFE 
MAKINA TAKIM 
MARDİN CİM. 
MARET
MARMARİS ALT. 
MARMARİS MART 
MARSHALL 
MEDYA HOL 
M ET AS 
MIGROS 
NET HOL 
NET TURİZM 
NETAS
OKAN TEKSTİL
OLMUKSA
PARSAN
PEG PROFILO
PETKIM
PETROKENT
PETROL OFİSİ
PINAR SU
PINAR SUT
PINAR UN
PIMAS
POLYLEN
SABAH
SARKUYSAN
SIFAS
SOKSA
SÖNMEZ FİL
DEMIRDOKUM
DISBANK
GARANTİ
KALKINMA BANK.
TSKB
SIEMENS
SİSE CAM
TUBORG
TUTUNBANK
TAT KONSERVE
TEKSTILBANK
TİRE KUTSAN
TOFAS OTO
TO FAS FAB.
TRAKYA CAM
TRANSTURK
TURCAS PETROL
TUPRAS
THY
UŞAK SERAMİK 
ÜNYE CİM.
VAKIF LEAS.
VAKIF YAT.
VESTEL
YKB
YASAS
YUNSA
75
70
55.4
100
110
60
48
45
20
50
100
188
0
0
10
60
0
25
150
6
16
0
20
30.7
5
53.6 
11.5 
0.24
25
19
150
100
100
30
30
8.4
12
90
15
0
30
54.7
26
0
0
33.4
0
69.8
23.82
25
64 12 0 0
85 50 30 150
30 25 25 69
37.5 25 47.4 100
32.6 53.5 35 75
60 100 100 110
200 260 562 950
21 25 20 21.5
20 10 1.5 35
50 10 80 40
38.8 20 23 100
17 0 0 0
628.4 207.2 236.2 273
5 10 0 24
0 0 0 0
10 19.8 15 10
83 42 61 55
6.8 6.75 6.16
0 0 0 0
16 37.5 100 210
12 0 1.13 40
70 0 20 110
86.2 115.5
2 0 1.65 0
0 4 10 0
0 0 0 0
20 20 15 20
12 0 0 0
33.3 12.83 0 1.67
80.75 61.3 86.3 211.34
5.75 0 0 27
7.5 9.74 27 136
0 0 20 56
7 0 0 15
60 0 0 0
21.9 17 24.25 29.5
200 70 100 100
100 0 0 0
12 0 0 0
200.8 55.84 18 110.25
50 65 80 90
0 41 62.5 104
52.35 55.78 64.54 82.35
60 72.5 75.6 0
13 33 25 50
50 75 60 65
20 10 11 10
0 0 30 40
25 70 28 47.65
30 90
49.9 22.9 14 60.5
20 0 30 50
94 114 200 300
85.4 26 80 300
24 8.7 28 40
8 10 10
44.2 39 44
10 31 34.36 23.86
0 0 0 0
9 10 0 15.44
44.25 38 97.16 107.44
26.67 40 35 50
0 12.2 10 40
40 15 2.5 3
75.94 54.12 40 55
17.66 13 25 50
25 0 15 50
TABLE 3
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
FIRMS WITH DIV. DECREASE 60% 39% 51% 36% 12%
FIRMS WITH DIV. INCREASE 23% 39% 35% 44% 68%
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIV. 17% 22% 14% 20% 20%
TABLE 3A
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREASE
(+) RETURN (-) RETURN
1990 38% 62%
1991 70% 30%
1992 48% 52%
1993 36% 64%
1994 36% 64%
TABLE 3B
1RMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE
(+) RETURN (-) RETURN
1990 63% 38%
1991 39% 61%
1992 41% 59%
1993 46% 54%
1994 47% 53%
TABLE 3C
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIVIDEND 
(+) RETURN (-) RETURN
1990 67% 33%
1991 31% 69%
1992 67% 33%
1993 64% 36%
1994 65% 35%
TABLE 4B
PERCENTAGE OF THE FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREAS 
ACCORDING TO DIVIDEND DECREASE AMOUNTS
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
0-10% 24% 22% 21% 39% 35%
10-20% 29% 28% 24% 30% 30%
20-30% 19% 17% 20% 5% 15%
>30% 24% 33% 35% 27% 20%
TABLE 4B
PERCENTAGE OF THE FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE 
ACCORDING TO DIVIDEND INCREASE AMOUNTS
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
0-10% 38% 28% 39% 24% 14%
10-20% 25% 19% 21% 20% 24%
20-30% 13% 11% 21% 29% 15%
>30% 25% 42% 18% 27% 47%
TABLE 5A
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREASE
AR TABLE
DAY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
-10 -0.0023 0.0076 -0.0019 0.0000 -0.0045
-9 0.0063 0.0005 -0.0001 0.0017 0.0071
-8 0.0008 0.0017 0.0012 0.0083 -0.0004
-7 0.0052 -0.0024 0.0016 -0.0100 -0.0080
-6 0.0028 -0.0072 0.0085 0.0027 0.0105
-5 0.0061 -0.0035 0.0025 0.0009 -0.0080
-4 -0.0071 0.0009 -0.0021 0.0016 -0.0033
-3 0.0049 0.0021 -0.0004 -0.0028 -0.0117
-2 -0.0004 0.0047 -0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0060
-1 0.0021 0.0150 0.0018 -0.0086 -0.0050
0 -0.0053 -0.0044 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0087
1 0.0122 -0.0058 -0.0013 -0.0008 0.0026
2 -0.0051 -0.0053 0.0021 0.0025 -0.0013
3 -0.0040 -0.0004 -0.0020 0.0025 0.0030
4 0.0023 0.0001 -0.0005 0.0009 0.0061
5 0.0037 0.0060 -0.0045 0.0041 -0.0122
6 -0.0010 -0.0005 0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0030
7 0.0026 -0.0443 -0.0013 0.0026 -0.0043
8 0.0089 -0.0007 -0.0024 0.0030 -0.0061
9 0.0034 -0.0035 -0.0018 0.0009 -0.0111
10 0.0004 -0.0045 0.0039 0.0060 -0.0016
TABLE 5B
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE
AR TABLE
DAY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
-10 0.0008 -0.0020 0.0011 0.0032 -0.0014
-9 0.0031 -0.0002 -0.0008 0.0013 -0.0046
-8 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0020 0.0019 -0.0012
-7 0.0118 0.0050 -0.0009 0.0046 -0.0078
-6 -0.0099 0.0032 -0.0019 0.0001 0.0022
-5 0.0038 -0.0014 0.0016 0.0046 0.0019
-4 0.0001 -0.0027 0.0023 -0.0003 -0.0064
-3 -0.0040 0.0058 0.0004 0.0008 -0.0018
-2 -0.0105 0.0057 0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0031
-1 -0.0003 -0.0017 0.0028 0.0026 -0.0036
0 0.0005 -0.0032 0.0039 -0.0015 -0.0022
1 -0.0030 -0.0057 0.0016 -0.0003 -0.0067
2 -0.0037 0.0076 -0.0027 -0.0015 0.0034
3 -0.0031 0.0007 -0.0048 -0.0037 -0.0007
4 -0.0016 0.0010 -0.0016 0.0033 -0.0028
5 0.0033 -0.0026 -0.0005 -0.0019 -0.0020
6 0.0038 -0.0009 0.0019 -0.0010 -0.0043
7 -0.0054 0.0012 -0.0048 0.0018 0.0007
8 -0.0053 0.0030 -0.0008 0.0017 0.0008
9 0.0013 0.0007 0.0022 0.0080 -0.0018
10 -0.0091 0.0003 -0.0032 -0.0008 -0.0013
TABLE 5C
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIVIDEND
AR TABLE
DAY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
-10 -0.0039 -0.0014 0.0022 -0.0029 0.0052
-9 0.0037 -0.0674 0.0020 -0.0051 0.0007
-8 0.0023 -0.0040 0.0022 0.0101 -0.0087
-7 -0.0028 -0.0015 -0.0017 0.0065 -0.0071
-6 0.0036 0.0009 0.0075 -0.0008 0.0007
-5 -0.0030 0.0015 -0.0016 0.0070 -0.0137
-4 -0.0091 0.0037 -0.0001 -0.0122 0.0010
-3 0.0090 0.0028 -0.0054 0.0066 -0.0060
-2 -0.0093 -0.0020 -0.0008 0.0037 -0.0044
-1 -0.0025 -0.0010 0.0046 0.0028 0.0036
0 0.0034 -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0085 0.0049
1 0.0058 -0.0001 -0.0101 -0.0047 0.0008
2 0.0093 -0.0038 -0.0047 0.0080 -0.0033
3 -0.0034 -0.0115 0.0062 0.0075 -0.0077
4 -0.0095 0.0111 0.0015 0.0091 -0.0011
5 -0.0047 -0.0080 -0.0118 0.0078 -0.0110
6 0.0061 0.0013 0.0139 0.0054 -0.0039
7 -0.0111 -0.0034 -0.0103 0.0029 -0.0029
8 -0.0140 -0.0027 0.0003 0.0012 -0.0002
9 0.0106 -0.0163 0.0093 0.0012 -0.0085
10 -0.0002 0.0079 -0.0057 0.0038 -0.0123
TABLE 6A
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREASE
T-RATIO
DAY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
-10 -0.6418 1.6867 -1.2372 0.0068 -0.8439
-9 2.0315 0.1142 -0.0658 0.4884 1.2126
-8 0.3086 0.4170 0.6812 1.3821 -0.0676
-7 1.2462 -0.8285 0.9419 -2.4443 -1.2811
-6 0.8483 -2.3238 0.8259 0.8811 1.9281
-5 1.8777 -1.1269 0.9797 0.2716 -1.8057
-4 -2.0446 0.1770 -1.3451 0.4613 -0.3643
-3 1.1412 0.5810 -0.1401 -0.6670 -2.0218
-2 -0.1250 1.0572 -0.1786 -0.4186 -0.8738
-1 0.7926 2.9813 1.0045 -2.6267 -0.8857
0 -1.5486 -1.3374 0.0970 -0.0569 -1.5931
1 1.3519 -1.6385 -0.4752 -0.2978 0.4275
2 -1.2153 -1.4298 0.8586 0.8586 -0.3062
3 -1.0344 -0.0879 -0.6825 0.7572 0.4776
4 0.5967 0.0283 -0.2525 0.4139 0.7599
5 0.9037 1.1549 -2.2571 1.6801 -2.2720
6 -0.3550 -0.1987 0.8589 -1.1830 -0.5443
7 0.5736 -0.9719 -0.5008 1.0739 -0.4938
8 1.9881 -0.2507 -1.0457 1.1881 -0.8740
9 1.0223 -0.9193 -0.8380 0.3958 -1.2833
10 0.1178 -1.5034 1.7666 1.9738 -0.2760
TABLE 6B
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE
T-RATIO
DAY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
-10 0.1181 -0.5941 0.4903 1.3682 -0.5553
-9 0.4036 -0.0830 -0.3221 0.5522 -1.7307
-8 -0.1909 0.0585 0.7696 0.8269 -0.4476
-7 3.1340 1.8159 -0.5920 1.9190 -2.3796
-6 -1.3063 1.1194 -1.0418 0.0555 0.8115
-5 0.7929 -0.5301 0.7772 1.8626 0.6097
-4 0.0138 -1.3688 1.0099 -0.1259 -1.9823
-3 -0.6169 2.1599 0.1590 0.3412 -0.6614
-2 -2.9526 1.6876 0.3235 -0.3033 -1.1896
-1 -0.0515 -0.9772 1.0956 1.0204 -1.3214
0 0.0743 -0.9695 1.2307 -0.7948 -0.7294
1 -0.5164 -1.4861 0.6025 -0.1306 -2.3810
2 -0.7029 2.5338 -0.9705 -0.5860 1.4130
3 -0.6117 0.2210 -1.8342 -1.0579 -0.2557
4 -0.3766 0.2851 -0.5334 1.2799 -1.1956
5 0.5289 -0.8717 -0.1856 -0.7173 -0.6593
6 0.6487 -0.3448 0.8289 -0.4487 -1.5857
7 -1.1234 0.3826 -1.7135 0.8424 0.2389
8 -0.7634 1.0105 -0.3350 0.7626 0.3145
9 0.2903 0.3505 0.8477 3.2332 -0.6901
10 -1.6502 0.1149 -1.2537 -0.2899 -0.5054
TABLE 6C
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIVIDEND
T-RATIO
DAY 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
-10 -0.4560 -0.1838 0.6171 -0.7528 1.0624
-9 0.3046 -0.8585 0.4109 -1.3184 0.1576
-8 0.2070 -0.5032 0.3401 2.5232 -1.5708
-7 -0.5011 -0.2338 -0.7121 1.2197 -1.8055
-6 0.2066 0.1709 2.1873 -0.1488 0.1165
-5 -0.3069 0.3649 -0.3994 1.9776 -2.7177
-4 -1.4062 1.2264 -0.0316 -2.4857 0.1946
-3 1.5127 0.4933 -0.8655 1.6165 -0.9788
-2 -2.0273 -0.3282 -0.2369 0.8593 -0.8157
-1 -0.2890 -0.3261 1.7658 0.6582 0.7662
0 0.3910 -0.0255 -0.3555 2.6356 0.9199
1 0.6193 -0.0110 -1.3084 -1.1555 0.2353
2 0.5985 -0.4806 -0.9350 1.4698 -0.5514
3 -0.5414 -0.9812 0.5201 1.7989 -1.4265
4 -1.0226 1.7031 0.2876 2.0537 -0.1921
5 -0.7382 -1.3428 -2.1523 1.5408 -2.2228
6 0.7395 0.2515 1.7733 1.1659 -0.6857
7 -2.4136 -0.3576 -2.0536 0.8010 -0.5969
8 -1.5139 -0.2805 0.0644 0.2361 -0.0392
9 1.6864 -3.3921 3.2214 0.2238 -1.9102
10 -0.0299 1.0406 -0.9650 1.0076 -2.0982
TABLE 7A
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREASE
[-1.0] T-STATISTICS
1990 -0.0032 -0.6412
1991 0.0106 1.7975
1992 0.0020 0.6704
1993 -0.0087 -2.1976
1994 -0.0137 -1.5337
TABLE 7B
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE
[-1,0] T-STATISTICS
1990 0.0002 0.0231
1991 -0.0049 -1.1960
1992 0.0066 1.3064
1993 0.0011 0.4093
1994 -0.0058 -1.3309
TABLE 7C
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIVIDE
[-1,0] T-STATISTICS
1990 0.0009 0.0925
1991 -0.0012 -0.2069
1992 0.0034 0.8154
1993 0.0114 2.1687
1994 0.0085 1.0310
TABLE 8A
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREASE 
[-1,0] T-STATISTICS 
1990-1993 0.0008 0.1851
1994 -0.0137 -1.5337
TABLE 8B
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE 
[-1,0] T-STATISTICS 
1990-1993 0.0047 1.2732
1994 -0.0058 -1.3309
TABLE 8C
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIVIDEND 
[-1,0] T-STATISTICS 
1990-1993 0.0145 5.2982
1994 0.0085 1.0310
TABLE 9A
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND DECREASE 
CAR TABLE
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
[-10,0]
0.0132
0.0151
0.0108
-0.0076
-0.0380
[-4,0]
-0.0058
0.0184
-0.0009
-0.0113
-0.0347
[-2 ,0]
-0.0036
0.0154
0.0016
- 0.0101
-0.0197
[-1,0]
-0.0032
0.0106
0.0020
-0.0087
-0.0137
[0,2]
0.0019
-0.0155
0.0010
0.0016
-0.0074
[0,4]
0.0001
-0.0158
-0.0015
0.0049
0.0017
[0,10]
0.0182
-0.0633
-0.0056
0.0180
-0.0367
TABLE 9B
FIRMS WITH DIVIDEND INCREASE 
CAR TABLE
[-10,0] [-4,0] [-2,0] [-1,0] [0,2] [0,4] [0,10]
1990 -0.006 -0.014 -0.010 0.000 -0.006 -0.011 -0.022
1991 0.009 0.004 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.000 0.002
1992 0.011 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.003 -0.004 -0.009
1993 0.017 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.004
1994 -0.028 -0.017 -0.009 -0.006 -0.006 -0.009 -0.017
TABLE 9C
FIRMS WITH CONSTANT DIVIDEND 
CAR TABLE
[-10,0] [-4,0] [-2,0] [-1,0] [0,2] [0,4] [0,10]
1990 -0.0086 -0.0084 -0.0083 0.0009 0.0184 0.0055 -0.0078
1991 -0.0686 0.0033 -0.0032 -0.0012 -0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0256
1992 0.0076 -0.0029 0.0026 0.0034 -0.0160 -0.0083 -0.0127
1993 0.0243 0.0095 0.0151 0.0114 0.0118 0.0284 0.0506
1994 -0.0238 -0.0008 0.0041 0.0085 0.0023 -0.0065 -0.0453
